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Response 
“Two Paths, One Result”: A (Heavily Qualified) 
Defense of Consensus Constitutionalism 
Mark Tushnet
* 
I.  Introduction 
Justin Driver’s The Consensus Constitution
1 is an important critique of a 
line  of  argument  that  has  become  prominent  in  scholarship  concerning 
constitutional  history  and  theory.    Professor  Driver  notes  that  several 
authors—most  prominently  Michael  Klarman  and  Barry  Friedman—have 
elaborated on an older argument associated with Robert Dahl.
2  They treat 
the Supreme Court as generally inscribing into constitutional law the views 
of an undifferentiated American people, the consensus to which Professor 
Driver’s  title  refers.
3    He  points  out  that  American  historians  have  heard 
about  consensus  before,  and  they  were  rightly  skeptical.
4    He  suggests  a 
similar skepticism should be brought to our reading of those who offer a 
 
  *  William  Nelson  Cromwell  Professor  of  Law,  Harvard  Law  School.    The  title  of  this 
Response is a play on the relation the People’s Republic of China claims to have to Hong Kong 
(and, ultimately, to Taiwan), “One Country, Two Systems.”  Agnes J. Bundy, The Reunification of 
China with Hong Kong and Its Implications for Taiwan: An Analysis of the “One Country, Two 
Systems” Model, 19 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 271, 276–77, 282 (1989). 
1. Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 755 (2011). 
2. See id. at 774 & n.121  (indicating that consensus constitutionalists, such as Barry Friedman, 
invoke political scientist Robert Dahl’s classic work about the Supreme Court (citing Robert A. 
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. 
L. 279 (1957))). 
3. See id. at 757 (defining “consensus constitutionalism” as “the claim that the Supreme Court 
interprets the Constitution in a manner that reflects the ‘consensus’ views of the American public”). 
4. See id. at 761–64 (detailing John Higham’s criticism of consensus-based history as glossing 
over historical diversity and conflict).  Driver also points out that the consensus constitutionalists 
depart from Dahl, who carefully confined his claim to the relationship between Supreme Court 
decisions and the views of the nation’s political elites, not the views of the American people taken 
as a whole.  Id. at 774. 158  Texas Law Review See Also        [Vol. 89:1 
 
 
“consensus Constitution.”
5  In doing so, Professor Driver argues and restores 
some of the normative leverage on contemporary constitutional issues that 
consensus constitutionalists seem to abandon. 
As Professor Driver shows, some of the historians’ skepticism about 
“consensus history” was unwarranted because there was less to the consensus 
school  than  they  thought.
6    Richard  Hofstadter,  an  important  figure  in 
Professor Driver’s narrative of consensus history, thought that his critics had 
misread him, or at least had not offered the most generous reading of his 
work that was available to them.
7 
I  think  that  something  similar  could  be  said  of  Professor  Driver’s 
criticism of the consensus constitutionalists.  No doubt, they use the term 
consensus quite extensively,
8 and Professor Driver’s reading is supportable 
from the texts that he is analyzing.  Yet, I think, there is a more generous 
reading of their work that is available and more defensible because it allows 
for what Professor Driver and I agree is essential for descriptive accuracy.  
What  is  needed  is  some  understanding  that  constitutional  controversy  has 
been  a  recurrent,  even  pervasive,  characteristic  of  our  constitutional 
discourse.
9  After outlining that alternative reading in Part II, I examine its 
implications for normative constitutional discourse in Part III.  Seeing the 
Constitution  as  always  contested—both  before  and  after  seemingly 
authoritative  resolutions  by  the  Supreme  Court—gives  those  who  are 
interested in normative discourse a reason to think that such discourse is not 
(always) futile.
10 
II.  The Constitution as Political Process 
As Professor Driver’s quotations amply show, Klarman and Friedman 
do refer more than occasionally to a consensus among the American people 
 
5. See id. at 757 (arguing that consensus constitutionalism “paint[s] American legal history with 
a  disfiguringly  broad  brush,  obscuring  the  deep  divisions  that  typify  public  response  to 
constitutional questions” and results in scholarship that makes for “bad history” and “worse law”). 
6. See id. at 766 (indicating that the debate regarding consensus-based history and conflict-
based  history  focused  more  upon  whether  the  charge  of  consensus  was  warranted  than  which 
framework was superior). 
7. See  id.  at  764–65  &  n.60  (remarking  that  Hofstadter  did  not  wish  to  be  classified  as  a 
consensus historian). 
8. See id. at 769 (“Unlike consensus historians writing during the 1950s, who did not generally 
invoke the term consensus in describing American unity, consensus constitutionalists repeatedly 
avail themselves of that term—and of the undergirding ideology.”). 
9. See id. at 801 (“[T]he meaning of the Constitution usually emerges not from consensus but 
from contestation—an ideological conflict that has occurred throughout American history regarding 
what the nation’s foundational document permits and requires.”). 
10. I should note here that I personally am not all that interested in normative constitutional 
discourse, at least in my scholarly capacity, because I doubt that I am well-positioned to have any 
practical effect on outcomes and, therefore, I think that my scholarly energies should be directed 
elsewhere.  I am skeptical as well about the ability of any legal academic to have practical effects of 
the relevant sort, but I have no interest in dictating to others what scholarly projects to pursue. 2010]  Response       159 
 
 
on  various  propositions  about  the  Constitution.
11    This  consensus,  they 
suggest, explains many Supreme Court decisions: The decisions reflect the 
consensus.
12    And,  importantly  for  a  normative  argument  associated  with 
their  approach,  they  suggest  that  Court  decisions  inconsistent  with  an 
assumed consensus are likely to have consequences that advocates of robust 
judicial review might overlook.  A decision inconsistent with the consensus 
might  be  widely  ignored,  for  example,  or  the  Court’s  reputation  and, 
therefore,  its  ability  to  continue  to  engage  in  robust  review  might  be 
impaired.
13 
But, Professor Driver argues, no such consensus exists, or ever has.
14  
Constitutional meanings are always contested.  This has implications for the 
descriptive  and  normative  claims  associated  with  consensus 
constitutionalism.    Descriptively,  the  Court  cannot  simply  ratify  a 
nonexistent consensus.  The Court’s relation to public views will always be 
more complex—always aligning itself with some of the American people but 
not all.  Normatively, the risk of noncompliance or impairment of the Court’s 
power might not come to pass or might be worth incurring, given that the 
Court will always have some allies in the wider society. 
There is, I think, an alternative way of understanding the arguments of 
consensus  constitutionalists,  more  compatible  with  a  political-science 
approach  to  understanding  the  Supreme  Court  as  one  political  institution 
among others—and so, more generous to consensus constitutionalists.  This 
Response is not the place to develop a full account of the alternative, but I 
can sketch its outlines and the research program it suggests. 
The alternative is that our constitutional politics takes two forms.  By 
“constitutional politics,” I mean the development of policies that implicate—
by supporting, rejecting, or impairing—what some in the society believe to 
 
11. Driver, supra note 1, at 770–74. 
12. See id. at 773 (quoting Friedman as stating that “the Supreme Court has rendered decisions 
that  meet  with  popular  approval  and  find  support  in  the  latest  Gallup  poll”  and  Klarman  as 
remarking that “[t]he justices reflect dominant public opinion too much for them to protect truly 
oppressed groups” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
13. See id. at 774 (“Justices who wish to avoid defiance of their rulings and to preserve the 
Court’s legitimacy steadfastly issue decisions consonant with public opinion.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); id. at 793 (addressing the proposition that Justices listen to public opinion “‘if they 
care about preserving the Court’s institutional power, about having their decisions enforced, about 
not being disciplined by politics’” (quoting BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW 
PUBLIC  OPINION  HAS  INFLUENCED  THE  SUPREME  COURT  AND  SHAPED  THE  MEANING  OF  THE 
CONSTITUTION 375 (2009))). 
14. Professor  Driver  identifies  a  “flourishing”  consensus  among  law  professors  in  the  last 
decade.    Driver,  supra  note  1,  at  767.    However,  among  the  American  public,  a  consensus  is 
“nonexistent  on  many  constitutional  questions,”  although  there  may  be  a  convergence  between 
opinion  and  judicial  outcomes  because  of  the  influence—rather  than  control,  as  consensus 
constitutionalists would have it—of the public.  Id. at 777–83. 160  Texas Law Review See Also        [Vol. 89:1 
 
 
be values inscribed in the Constitution.
15  One form of constitutional politics 
operates through the legislative and executive branches and the other through 
the judiciary.  The claim made by consensus constitutionalists, taken in its 
best light, is that in general, the results—the constitutional policies actually 
pursued—will be the same whichever process is used.
16  Or, more crudely, 
you do not get from the courts anything that you would not have gotten from 
legislatures. 
Of  course,  supporting  this  “same  results  claim”  empirically  will  be 
difficult.  Here are some of the difficulties: 
(1)  Political actors make strategic decisions about which path to follow 
that are predicated in part on their judgments about which path is more likely 
to produce success.
17  So we might not be able to compare the outcome of the 
judicial path to the outcome reached when political actors use the legislative–
executive path to seek exactly the same policy. 
(2)    Sometimes  political  actors  compete  over  which  path  to  follow.  
That competition sometimes leads to both paths being pursued at the same 
time (though by different actors).
18  Yet, observing outcomes from the two 
paths might not tell us about the paths as such, which is what we want to 
know in examining the “two paths, one result claim.”  Suppose the results 
differ.
19  The actor who pursued the legislative–executive path might simply 
have been better (or worse) in performing the tasks required in legislative 
 
15. This formulation is designed to avoid taking a position on what values are so inscribed 
because the individuals who take such positions in ways relevant to political analysis are political 
actors,  not  scholars  stipulating  what  the  Constitution  means.    See  Jack  M.  Balkin,  Framework 
Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 573 (2009) (noting that political 
majorities provide direction to the Supreme Court as to constitutional values).  I suspect that the 
formulation  omits  some  possible  relations  between  policies  and  constitutional  values,  but  I  am 
confident that whatever omissions there are could be incorporated into the full picture that I am only 
sketching here. 
16. See Driver, supra note 1, at 772 (“Even in the absence of judicial review, Sunstein contends 
that  popular  views  shape  modern  constitutional  understandings.”  (citing  CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  A 
CONSTITUTION  OF  MANY  MINDS:  WHY  THE  FOUNDING  DOCUMENT  DOESN’T  MEAN  WHAT  IT 
MEANT BEFORE 4 (2009))). 
17. See JERRY W. GILLEY, THE MANAGER AS POLITICIAN 121 (2006) (noting that selection of a 
solution with the “opportunity for the highest degree of success” is the “principal responsibility” of 
a politician who is contemplating policy alternatives). 
18. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Dred Scott to Barack Obama: The Ebb and Flow of Race 
Jurisprudence,  25 HARV.  BLACKLETTER  L.J.  1,  23–25  (2009)  (chronicling  efforts  by  President 
Johnson, Congress, and the federal judiciary to promote civil rights during the 1960s through the 
appointment of African-American jurists and the passage of civil rights legislation). 
19. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 119 (remarking that slavery was not abolished by the 
judicial path but instead by the legislative–executive path through a constitutional amendment).  I 
make this assumption for ease of exposition.  A parallel argument can be made if the results from 
the two processes are the same, but laying it out is more difficult.  Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil 
Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 766 (1991) (indicating that by the time Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973), was decided, many states had already expanded legal access to abortion and that 
the number and rate of abortions did not substantially increase after Roe). 2010]  Response       161 
 
 
and executive politics than the actor who pursued the judicial path was at 
performing the tasks required in that process.
20 
(3)  Sometimes slightly different policies will be pursued through the 
different processes, and, of course, the processes operate at different paces.  
So,  inferring  differences  in  the  processes  from  different  outcomes  can  be 
hazardous.
21    Similarly,  inferring  anything  when  both  paths  yield  similar 
results can be hazardous.
22 
Still,  consensus  constitutionalists  can  make  some  rough  empirical 
judgments  by,  for  example,  looking  at  the  outcomes  of  the  legislative–
executive  process  with  respect  to  some  policy  and  the  outcomes  of  the 
judicial one with respect to policies in roughly the same area of concern.
23  
The comparison will not be perfect, but consensus constitutionalists could 
think it will shed some light on the two paths, one result claim. 
But,  of  course,  consensus  constitutionalists  understand  that  the  two 
processes  are  different  because  legislatures  and  courts  are  different 
institutions.  Legislatures respond to some specific types of efforts to get 
them to act—roughly, by asking how many constituents care about an issue 
pressed upon them by policy activists.  They have some institution-specific 
veto points, like committees.
24  Courts respond to other types of efforts to get 
 
20. The  legislative–executive  actor  might  be  exceptionally  good  at  mobilizing  political 
pressure, for example, while the judicial actor might be merely ordinary or worse at developing a 
credible trial record to support the constitutional argument that he ends up making.  Cf. Ogletree, 
supra note 18, at 17 (characterizing Chief Justice Warren as “a linchpin in the unanimous decision 
rendered by the Court in Brown [v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)]”); id. at 18–19 
(hypothesizing that desegregation and integration would have occurred more quickly had President 
Eisenhower followed the example set by President Truman, who integrated the armed forces). 
21. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 
VA. L. REV. 7, 10–11 (1994) (arguing that while racial desegregation likely would have occurred 
without Brown, the decision hastened “the enactment of landmark civil rights legislation”). 
22. An  additional  complexity,  which  I  ignore  here,  is  associated  with  federalism.    Political 
actors can pursue one path in one state and another path in others, even with respect to the same 
policies.  See Richard Gregory Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of the Pre-Roe Case Law, 77 
MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1726–27 (1979) (noting that while a number of state legislatures had expanded 
legal  access  to  abortion  before Roe,  at  least  one  restrictive  abortion  statute  had  been  judicially 
invalidated,  and  a  number  of  constitutional  challenges  had  been  raised  by  defendants  in  state 
abortion prosecutions). 
23. For  example,  comparison  of  race  discrimination  in  schools—attacked  via  the  judicial 
process—and  race  discrimination  in  employment—attacked  via  the  legislative–executive  one—
allows for such an analysis.  See Ogletree, supra note 18, at 18 (“Brown clearly made the practice of 
racially segregated schooling throughout the nation unconstitutional.”); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 
613,  638–39  (indicating  that  Congress  attacked  employment  discrimination  through  legislative 
efforts “to respond to the Supreme Court’s recent decisions by restoring the civil rights protections 
that were dramatically limited by those decisions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
24. See John E. Owens & Burdett A. Loomis, Qualified Exceptionalism: The US Congress in 
Comparative Perspective, 12 J. LEGIS. STUD. 258, 267–68 (2006) (remarking that “[t]he legislative 
process  in  the  Congress  includes  more  institutional  veto  points  than  any  other”  because  of 
overlapping and dispersed committee responsibilities, a tedious legislative process, a decentralized 
character, and weak political parties that “make legislative bargaining and compromise essential”). 162  Texas Law Review See Also        [Vol. 89:1 
 
 
them to act—putting the machinery in motion whenever an individual files 
the appropriate papers (but perhaps taking those papers seriously only if the 
litigant offers some indication that there is more than a simple crank in front 
of them)—and to different kinds of veto points embodied in justiciability 
doctrines.
25  These and other differences mean that the same results claim has 
to be qualified. 
Here are some, among many, qualifications: 
(1)    Time  frames  matter.    Some  policy  changes  can  occur  relatively 
rapidly, while others take more time to settle in.  And the two processes 
operate at different paces.  Further, the processes interact in complex ways.
26  
A short-term victory in the courts might turn into a long-term loss.
27  A more 
interesting possibility for the consensus constitutionalist is that a short-term 
loss in the courts might turn into a long-term victory through the legislative 
process.
28  Or, more interesting to the critic of consensus constitutionalism, a 
short-term  victory  in  the  courts  might  provoke  an  immediate  adverse 
response in the legislative process but a longer term success.
29  The same 
 
25. I know that referring to justiciability doctrines as veto points is technically inaccurate.  Cf. 
Mark  Tushnet,  Constitutional  Workarounds,  87  TEXAS  L.  REV.  1499,  1503  &  n.27  (2008) 
(indicating that attempts by a legislature to work around constitutional text obstructing its ability to 
reach a desired goal “would undoubtedly face serious justiciability objections”).  But, I think it is 
metaphorically accurate. 
26. Consider here that the results emanating from the judicial policy-making process might 
stimulate responses from the legislative–executive one, not merely with respect to specific policies 
but also to the courts’ composition.  See, e.g., William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s  “Court-Packing”  Plan,  1966  SUP.  CT.  REV.  347,  347–48  (characterizing  President 
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan “either as an impulsive act born of the hubris created by FDR's 
landslide victory in 1936 or as a calculated plot hatched many months before in angry resentment at 
the [A.L.A.] Schechter [Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935),] verdict” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
27. The conventional example here, though a complex one, is Roe v. Wade.  The pro-choice 
victory is said to have sparked a pro-life response that produced dramatic gains for a conservative 
Republican Party that implemented policies said to be adverse overall to the interests of women, 
though it has been unable to undo Roe itself.  See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 766 (“[T]he decision 
may  well  have  created  the  Moral  Majority,  helped  defeat  the  equal  rights  amendment,  and 
undermined  the  women’s  movement  by  spurring  opposition  and  demobilizing  potential 
adherents.”).  The long-term defeat, that is, was not that women seeking abortions in the early 
twenty-first century found it more difficult to obtain them than women seeking abortions in 1970 
did, but rather that the overall situation of women in the early twenty-first century was worse than it 
would have been had Roe not generated support for a conservative Republican Party.  See id. (“By 
1973, . . . state legislatures were moving firmly to expand legal access to abortion, and it is likely 
that a broad guarantee of access would have been available even without Roe.  However surprising 
the point may be, Roe did not dramatically increase the actual number or rate of abortions.”). 
28. Here  the  conventional  example  is  Bowers  v.  Hardwick,  478  U.S.  186  (1986),  and  the 
ensuing backlash in support of gay rights.  See Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and 
Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 443–44 (2005) (noting the decline in public opposition to 
homosexuality from 55% to 33% in the seventeen years after Bowers, and citing court decisions in 
Hawaii and Vermont in favor of same-sex couples). 
29. This is the still-open possibility associated with gay-marriage litigation.  For an interesting 
analysis of the backlash argument in this context and its limitations, see Thomas M. Keck, Beyond 2010]  Response       163 
 
 
results claim does not require that we ignore these possibilities.  Rather, it 
directs  us  to  think  about  the  circumstances  under  which  they  might  be 
realized. 
(2)  An important variant on the time frame question is this: Sometimes  
a policy is adopted through the judicial path, but it has relatively little effect 
in  the  short  run—and  in  the  long  run  too,  if  policy  making  along  the 
legislative–executive path does not come to the same result over time.
30  But, 
if policy making along the legislative–executive path does come to the result 
earlier  reached  on  the  judicial  path,  are  we  observing  the  two  paths,  one 
result  phenomenon?    Only  if  the  earlier  judicial  decision  has  little  or  no 
causal effect on the outcome reached along the legislative–executive path.  
And determining whether there is such a causal effect is extremely difficult.
31 
(3)    As  I  have  suggested,  we  might  want  to  examine  the  strategic 
choices that political actors make.  One obvious possibility is that political 
actors may calculate that their chances of success in the legislative–executive 
process are low (say, because of a veto point like the filibuster in the Senate), 
while their chances of success through the judicial process, though slim, are 
not quite as low.  And they might calculate that the time frame questions I 
have mentioned might make it possible for a judicial victory to “stick.”
32  
 
Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151, 
152–55 (2009). 
30. See  STEPHEN  BREYER,  MAKING  OUR  DEMOCRACY  WORK:  A  JUDGE’S  VIEW,  xii–xiii 
(2010) (“[This book] describe[s] several instances where Supreme Court decisions were ignored or 
disobeyed, where the president’s or the public’s acceptance of Court decisions was seriously in 
doubt.    These  examples  of  the  Court’s  infirmity  . . .  demonstrate  that  public  acceptance  is  not 
automatic and cannot be taken for granted.”). 
31. The  important  example  here  is  the  experience  with  elementary  and  secondary  school 
desegregation after Brown v. Board of Education.  It is indisputable that Brown had relatively small 
effects in the deep South until Congress and the President came around in the early 1960s and, 
especially, until southern school systems faced the threat of losing federal financial aid after 1965.  
See Klarman, supra note 21, at 9–10 (explaining that “Brown was directly responsible for only the 
most token forms of southern public school desegregation,” which arose “[o]nly after the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act threatened to cut off federal educational funding for segregated school districts and the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1966 adopted stringent enforcement guidelines”).  
Klarman contends that the decisions made by Congress and the President in the early 1960s were 
not causally affected by Brown, though they were so affected by the civil rights movement (but that 
movement was not, in his view, causally affected by Brown).  See id. at 11 (arguing that Brown 
contributed to the civil rights movement by instigating southern white resistance to integration, such 
as the “brutal suppression of civil rights demonstrations,” which made it politically expedient for 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to advance civil rights legislation).  Most historians of the civil 
rights movement, I think, disagree with the argument that Brown was not causally effective on the 
legislative–executive policies adopted in the 1960s.  See id. at 75 (“According to deeply entrenched 
conventional wisdom, Brown was directly responsible for the 1960s civil rights movement, which in 
turn inspired the transformative civil rights legislation of the mid-1960s.”). 
32. Obviously, the model I am working from here is the NAACP’s choice to pursue litigation 
against elementary and secondary school segregation.  See Orley Ashenfelter et al., Evaluating the 
Role of Brown v. Board of Education in School Equalization, Desegregation, and the Income of 
African Americans, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 213, 219–22 (2006) (chronicling how the NAACP 
launched a direct challenge to unequal funding and racial separation in elementary and secondary 164  Texas Law Review See Also        [Vol. 89:1 
 
 
Slim chances are better than none from a political actor’s point of view.  In a 
related inquiry, we might want to disaggregate the category of political actors 
to see whether actors who choose to pursue the judicial policy-making route 
are different in systematic and interesting ways from those who choose to 
pursue the legislative–executive one.
33 
(4)  Again, as I have suggested, contested constitutionalism means that 
judicial decisions will have some support no matter what the result.  Assume 
that the result from the courts differs, to some degree, from that which would 
have  resulted  from  the  legislative  process.    We  might  ask:  Under  what 
conditions will the judicial decision stick?  We might look into the ways in 
which political actors use the results from the judicial process in their actions 
in  the  legislative–executive  one—as  targets  in  the  backlash  scenario,  of 
course, but also as normative validation that can play a political role.
34 
(5)  Finally, to give systematic form to a point Professor Driver makes, 
the Supreme Court is a small-numbers institution compared to Congress and 
state legislatures.
35  The statistics of sheer numbers means that there will 
necessarily be greater variance in outcomes from the judicial policy-making 
process than from the legislative–executive one, which implies that we will 
always observe some degree of difference between the outcomes of the two 
processes.    Sometimes  the  greater  variance  associated  with  the  Supreme 
Court will be quite consequential.
36 
The  two  paths,  one  result  claim  associated  with  consensus 
constitutionalism  is  clearly  overstated.    Institutions  differ,  and  institutions 
matter.  But consensus constitutionalists, at least in their best moments, know 
that.  Consensus historians did too. 
 
schools).  The possibility of legislative success in Congress was blocked by the filibuster veto-point.  
Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 
1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1281–82. 
33. The obvious hypothesis is that lawyers will be found in leadership roles in larger numbers 
in groups that use the judicial route than in those that use the legislative–executive one. 
34. Here, the basic text is Martin Luther King’s speech at the Holt Street Baptist Church in 
connection with the Montgomery bus boycott: “If we are wrong, the Supreme Court of this nation is 
wrong.  If we are wrong, the Constitution of the United States is wrong.  If we are wrong, God 
Almighty is wrong.  If we are wrong, Jesus of Nazareth was merely a utopian dreamer that never 
came down to earth.  If we are wrong, justice is a lie.”  Martin Luther King, Jr., Address to MIA 
Mass Meeting at Holt Street Baptist Church (Dec. 5, 1955). 
35. See  Driver,  supra  note  1,  at  786  (“[L]egal  scholars  should  not  attempt  to  understand 
outcomes in Supreme Court cases primarily by examining the attitudes of 300 million Americans 
toward constitutional questions when they can get a better read by paying attention to the attitudes 
of just nine.”). 
36. This is a systematic way of putting the widely-noted point that chance—the timing of a 
death or a retirement, or the selection of one rather than another nominee—plays a big part in 
generating Supreme Court outcomes.  See Keith Krehbiel, Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-
the-Median Game, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 231, 238 (2007) (noting that the “overwhelming consensus 
of observers of the Supreme Court” is that appointments to the Court have long-term consequences 
for public policy). 2010]  Response       165 
 
 
III. Why Normative Discourse Remains Possible 
Professor  Driver  is  concerned  that  consensus  constitutionalism  is  a 
counsel  of  despair.
37    Why  bother  to  use  the  courts  if  the  outcomes  are 
predetermined  by  the  existing  consensus  among  the  American  people  on 
what  the  Constitution  means?    Contested  constitutionalism  offers  some 
solace. 
I  am  not  particularly  interested  in  specifics  about  normativity  in 
constitutional theorizing; I tend to think that it is self-indulgent (who, other 
than the author’s friends and family, really cares what a law professor thinks 
is  the  right  constitutional  thing  to  do?).    But,  the  idea  of  contested 
constitutionalism does show why normativity remains possible—not merely 
because disagreement makes successful normative argument possible. 
The starting point is the observation that interpreting recent history is 
quite  difficult  and  interpreting  contemporary  events  even  more  so.    We 
barely  have  a  handle  on  the  significance  and  meaning  of  the  Reagan 
presidency for the American political order, for example: Did it redefine the 
entire structure of American politics, shifting every institution rightward on 
almost every issue, or did it take as a given the basic structure of the New 
Deal and the Great Society but put the brakes on further movement to the 
left?  What was the constitutional consensus in the 1980s and 1990s that 
consensus constitutionalists ask us to find? 
More  important  for  normative  discourse,  what  is  the  constitutional 
consensus today—on affirmative action, gay rights, and health care?  I have 
no doubt that consensus constitutionalists could, and perhaps have, come up 
with assertions about the consensus in the 1980s and 1990s and perhaps even 
about  what  today’s  consensus  is.    They  could  rely  on  surveys  of  public 
opinion and such.  But everyone who studies public opinion surveys knows 
how tricky they are to interpret—and, though here I go beyond my expertise, 
I  suspect  that  interpreting  public  opinion  surveys  on  constitutionally-
inflected policies is especially tricky.
38 
 
37. See Driver, supra note 1, at 783 (“Given that the consensus-based approach to legal history 
is predicated on understanding Justices to march along with society at large, it is not surprising that 
they  also  view  judicial  decisions  as  seemingly  inevitable.    Consensus  constitutionalists  come 
dangerously  close  to  viewing  Supreme  Court  decisions  as  being  somehow  foreordained  by  the 
zeitgeist.”). 
38. Do public opinion surveys that ask, “Do you approve of racial intermarriage?”, tell us much 
about  the  following  question,  “How  many  people  approve  of  laws  prohibiting  racial 
intermarriage?”?  See Ed Blair et al., How to Ask Questions About Drinking and Sex: Response 
Effects in Measuring Consumer Behavior, 14 J. MARKETING RES. 316, 316 (1977) (concluding 
from a study in which respondents were interviewed about “behaviors and conditions that are . . . 
generally  not  discussed  in  public  without  tension”  that:  “closed-ended  questions  elicit  negative 
response  effects  (underreporting)”;  “closed-ended  questions  also  seem  more  sensitive  to  social 
desirability factors, and result in depressed reporting about socially sensitive behavior or attitudes”;  
and “response effects . . . decrease with increasing question length”). 166  Texas Law Review See Also        [Vol. 89:1 
 
 
With  respect  to  prior  decades,  the  pervasive  practice  of  historical 
revisionism  ought  to  offer  some  caution  about  accepting  such 
characterizations too readily.  Revisionist scholarship regularly destabilizes 
accepted understandings of the past and, even more so, I think, of the recent 
past.
39  Over time, I suppose, the differences between revisionists and their 
predecessors  and  successors  narrow,  although  I  doubt  that  they  are  ever 
eliminated. 
The bite of this observation comes when we reach the present.  I am not 
sure  why  anyone  interested  in  normative  issues  in  contemporary 
constitutional law should care whether Dred Scott v. Sandford
40 or Plessy v. 
Ferguson
41 was wrong the day it was decided, so I am not bothered by a 
consensus constitutionalist’s assertion that those decisions reflected the then-
consensus of the American people.
42  The assertion may be wrong or right, 
but it has no contemporary normative punch except insofar as it is used to 
support the two paths, one result claim.  But obviously we should care when 
someone asserts that some constitutional position (that we like, presumably) 
is inconsistent with the existing consensus, when that assertion is used to 
support  a  political  recommendation  that  political  actors  pursue  one  rather 
than the other path.
43 
But, revisionism should tell us that claims about today’s consensus are 
no more than claims—interpretations of contemporary politics and culture 
that  might  be  right  but  might  be  wrong.    Even  more,  if  conflicts  over 
constitutional meaning are ever-present, though shifting from one subject to 
another over time, that some are pressing and others resisting some specific 
constitutional claim strongly indicates that we are not yet in a situation of 
constitutional consensus.  Maybe one side seems to have the upper hand for 
the moment, but things could change, slowly or rapidly. 
Using historical experience to draw normative conclusions about what 
should be done in such circumstances is quite hazardous.  I must emphasize 
 
39. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 
173,  174  (1994)  (“Professor  Klarman’s  account  [of  Brown]  has  the  peculiar  and  no  doubt 
unintended  effect  of  substantially  reducing  the  apparent  role  of  African  Americans  in  [the 
transformative racial] change, coming close to eliminating African Americans as historical agents, 
as acting subjects in the historical process rather than its objects.”). 
40. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
41. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
42. For example, Klarman views Plessy as a “product of its times,” not “‘a product of racist 
judging.’”  Driver, supra note 1, at 788 (quoting Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 26 (1996)).  Dred Scott has also been viewed as a 
product of an inability to accept racial equality in the mid-nineteenth century.  See, e.g., MARK A. 
GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 3–4 (2006) (recognizing that 
Dred Scott resulted from a political environment in which slavery could only be abolished through 
civil war, political fiat, or electoral change). 
43. I take it that the point is not to say “wait another decade or so to seek your goal,” but rather 
to say that pursuit of the legislative–executive path is more likely to bring about the changes in 
public opinion that are necessary as a predicate for victory on either path. 2010]  Response       167 
 
 
that these are the circumstances of essentially all constitutional controversies 
when they occur.
44  Maybe a backlash will occur and bad things will get 
entrenched; maybe a backlash will occur in the short run, but the public will 
recoil  at  the  backlash  and  provide  support  for  a  claim  that  it  initially 
disfavored; maybe the decision will be greeted with indifference, even by 
people who were passionately on one or the other side a few or many years 
before,  when  the  legislation  now  upheld  or  struck  down  was  enacted;  or 
maybe people will end up thinking that the Court got the right answer.  I am 
sure there are other possibilities. 
As  far  as  I  can  tell,  no  sensible  political  actor  would  make  serious 
decisions  about  how  to  proceed  based  on  the  claims  of  consensus 
constitutionalism.  And, as far as I can tell, no serious political actor does.  
Of  course  such  actors  think  about  the  things  to  which  consensus 
constitutionalism directs their attention, because those things are relevant to 
the making of sensible political choices.  But they also think about other 
things—how cultural change occurs outside of legislatures, for example.
45 
Put  another  way,  the  circumstances  of  today’s  decision  making, 
whenever “today” occurs, are so different from historical circumstances that 
consensus  constitutionalism,  even  if  descriptively  accurate,  cannot  offer 
interesting normative guidance.  When a consensus constitutionalist offers 
some  observations  about  backlash  and  the  like,  he  or  she  is  acting  as  an 
interpreter  of  contemporary  politics  and  culture  as  a  participant  in  a 
contemporary dialogue about political choices open to political actors, not as 
a historian or constitutional theorist.  Maybe the consensus constitutionalist 
happens to be a really good analyst of contemporary politics and culture, but 
maybe not.  Maybe his or her observations about strategy ought to be taken 
seriously.  But maybe not. 
IV. Conclusion 
In an appropriately qualified form, there is undoubtedly something to 
consensus constitutionalism.  Over some ill-defined medium-to-long run, the 
odds are slim that a public policy initially developed by the courts will be 
sustainable  unless  it  obtains  (or  possesses  from  the  outset)  support  from 
 
44. Cf. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 14, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. 
Sebelius, No. 10-1014 (Feb. 8, 2011) (arguing that because of the constitutional controversy and 
political upheaval surrounding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-148,  124  Stat.  119  (2010),  “the  States,  citizens[,]  and  the  economy  remain  mired  in 
uncertainty”).  These circumstances seem unsettled compared to how things seem in retrospect, 
when the controversies have been resolved, if only due to death and other sources of irrelevance. 
45. Cf.  Ogletree,  supra  note  18,  at  25  (noting  President  Johnson’s  ambition  to  “transform 
America’s attitudes toward African Americans” through the Great Society, although this led to 
political losses in the South). 168  Texas Law Review See Also        [Vol. 89:1 
 
 
political leaders in the legislative and executive branches.
46  Nothing in that 
formulation requires the analyst to assume that there is a consensus among 
the American people about anything.  To that extent, references to consensus 
are misleading.  And consensus constitutionalists should be criticized when 
they make such references without appropriate qualification.  In this they 
resemble Hofstadter, in both his early and his later statements about what he 
was after when referring to consensus in American history.
47 
From  a  normative  point  of  view,  the  most  important  qualification 
embedded in the modest formulations of the two paths, one result claim that I 
have defended is that sometimes judicial decisions have a causally important 
effect on legislative and executive action.  It is that possibility that makes 
consensus constitutionalism deeply misleading as a normative guide. 
So Professor Driver is wrong and right: wrong in developing criticisms 
of  consensus  constitutionalism  that  rest  on  readings  of  the  relevant 
scholarship that are less generous than they might be, but right in criticizing 
overstated claims about consensus on constitutional matters and in arguing 
that consensus constitutionalism, whether in an excessively strong or in an 
appropriately qualified form, does not deprive those who want to do so of the 
opportunity to press their normative positions in the courts. 
 
46. The parenthetical qualification tries to account for situations in which political leaders in 
those branches want to pursue the policy that the courts initiate and, indeed, would have initiated it 
on their own but for the presence of opponents at strategic veto-points. 
47. Hofstadter later said that his introduction to The American Political Tradition “was not 
written in order to establish some single overarching theory about American politics or American 
political leadership.”  RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION  AND  THE 
MEN WHO MADE IT xxi (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1985) (1948).  Nonetheless, he later accepted that 
this effort to avoid an overarching theory was for naught.  Id. at xxii. 